IGAD
Livestock
Policy
Initiative

The Political Economy of Livestock Policy Among the Somalis

David K. Leonard
Professorial Fellow
Institute of Development Studies (Sussex)

IGAD LPI Working Paper No. 05 - 08

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ii

Abbreviations iv

Executive Summary v

Introduction 1

Part I: Somali Geography, Production and Trade 2

Part II: The Political Systems of the former Republic of Somalia 3

Part III: How is 'Everyday Order' Created in 'Chaos'? 5

Part IV: Key Somali Political Groups on Livestock Issues 10
- Clans 10
- Traders 11
- Diaspora 11
- Warlords 12
- Rootless Young Soldiers 12
- Herders 13

Part V: Policies and Options 14
- Land Tenure 14
- Water 15
- Trade and the Ethiopian Border 15
- Charcoal and Deforestation 16
- Animal Health, Disease Control and Export Certification 16
- Pharmaceutical Supplies 22

Part VI: Policy Recommendations 24

Appendix A: Map of Somalia and Its Regions 26

Appendix B: Map of the Distribution of Somali Clans 27

Bibliography & References 28

PREFACE

This paper is part of a series of political economy Working Papers prepared for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI) and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The purpose of these papers is to explore strategic political economy issues that would facilitate or inhibit livestock policy reforms in the IGAD region that would benefit poor producers.

Specifically, this paper seeks to understand how the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD LPI), a project jointly managed by IGAD and the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative of FAO (PPLPI), can assist the poor livestock producers in the greater Horn of Africa to improve their livelihoods through strategic policy or institutional interventions. Unlike many policy papers, however, this report specifically and explicitly examines the political context in which livestock are produced, and aims to identify entry points that are truly feasible given these political realities. The report identifies key national and international actors, institutions and processes that surround formal and informal policy-making relevant to livestock production, the institutional bases of existing policies, and finally, strategies and resources required to make the politically feasible changes and creations possible. The recommendations made in this paper are therefore based on strategic choices, and not the technical or economic merits of various policy options.

Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries, and especially those of the Horn of Africa. Animals are a source of protein for human diets and can serve to provide income, employment and foreign exchange within a country. For many low income producers, livestock also serves as a store of wealth, provides draught power and organic fertilizer for crop production, acts as a means of transport, and serves as a vital component of social functions and exchange. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly. This sector growth could provide opportunities for the livestock-dependent poor to improve their livelihood, and this report aims to recommend politically feasible policy and institutional changes that can allow this to happen.

To arrive at its recommendations, this report uses the analytic tools of political science to determine policies that will be truly feasible in a particular real-world political context. The author is neither an economist nor a specialist in livestock production and is not using the criteria of those disciplines in its suggestions. The report instead seeks to select on the grounds of political feasibility from among the recommendations that local and international experts have made on technical or economic grounds. Thus, the report identifies key national and international actors, institutions and processes and their role in policy-making relevant to livestock, the institutional bases of existing policies, and finally strategies and resources required to make selected changes and creations possible.

Methodologically, the paper is based on several weeks of field work in the area, supplemented with a thorough review of government documents, newspapers and recently published research. The author relied foremost upon the informed observer method of research, conducting interviews with individuals and groups of people in a position to understand the political economy of the livestock sector, including the processes that shape its policies and their reform. Thus interviews were held with those in the government, the donor community, non-governmental organizations, academia, and the leadership of relevant livestock and other civil society organizations. These interviews were not a 'random sample' nor even necessarily 'representative'; the author sought those who had knowledge drawn from their own work and experience.

Due to the sensitive political nature of this research, interviewees were offered anonymity and confidentiality for their statements, and very few people chose to waive this right. Even though this report cannot cite their names, the author subjected informants' statements to high standards of rigor. The author sought to be conscious of any partisan bias or rumor that informants might have had in their report and whether they were actually in a position to know on personal or very strong secondary authority what they reported. In most cases corroboration for key analytic points was sought as well, either from other informants or through quotable statements from academic literature. Where corroboration was impossible and the point was important the author generally has indicated the number of people who supported the point, so the reader can judge for him/herself the strength of the evidence. On occasion, the use of corroboration via academic literature may give the paper a 'desk study' veneer, but it is the understandings of the informants – analyzed with the theoretical tools of political science – that drive the conclusions.

I hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is welcome by the author, IGAD LPI, FAO PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Disclaimer

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of either the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations or the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its authorities concerning the delimitations of its frontiers or boundaries.

The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not constitute in any way the position of the FAO, IGAD, the Livestock Policy Initiative nor the governments studied.

David K. Leonard
Research Director
Institute of Development Studies (Sussex)

Date of publication: 2007.

ABBREVIATIONS

AU-IBAR	African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources
CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
DFID	Department for International Development (U.K.)
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FN	Field Notes
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
LPI	Livestock Policy Initiative
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
SERECU	Somali Ecosystem Rinderpest Eradication Coordination Unit
TFG	Transitional Federal Government [of Somalia]
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
WSP	War-torn Societies Project

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Analysis

The Somali pastoral system of production covers six political entities. Three of them are within the borders of the former Republic of Somalia and do not meet the definition of states. Despite the warfare that has often engulfed the former Somalia, it is a mistake to think of the three political entities that occupy it as anarchic. Lineage institutions have survived from the colonial era and been resurrected to provide venues for negotiation, consensus-building and the reduction of interpersonal violence, even if not the authoritative imposition of decisions upon groups of the unwilling. However, after 15 years of centrality to the continuity of Somali governance and the recreation of quasi-state political authorities, these lineage institutions are showing signs of stress. As their great influence came to be recognized they were penetrated by patronage and used by warlords to prosecute sub-clan warfare. They no longer are able to provide consensus representation even in the peaceful political systems of Somaliland and Puntland. Somalis therefore have experimented with new political institutions that could provide a greater basis for cross-clan action and authoritative decision-making — democracy in Somaliland and Islamic sheria in all the territories but especially by the now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts. Indeed sheria now is a central, unifying ideology throughout the Somalis, even if there is conflict over its interpretation and the instrumentalities through which it will be enforced. Somali governmental processes thus are present, but weak in their ability to impose decisions and to project their authority into the rural areas.

The key actors in livestock policy-making in the Somali systems are: first and foremost, livestock traders, secondly animal health professionals, thirdly the youth mobilized into the militias, who have the primary claim on general budgetary resources, and finally, a range of competing donors. Herders themselves are incorporated into the political process through patronage and have little influence on the policies that emerge, even though they are greatly affected by them.

Policies

Land and water issues are critical to the livestock production system but the Somali polities have too little ability to project their authority into the rural areas to address them effectively at the moment. It would be valuable for Somali policy-makers to participate in IGAD-LPI sponsored technical discussions of these issues, however, both to educate themselves for the future and for them to represent Somali perspectives to the other countries in the region. The TFG is the only one of the three political entities in the former Somalia that is internationally recognized. Thus formal discussions at the diplomatic level are precluded. All the political systems in the area have shown considerable flexibility on technical discussions and cooperation, however [FN: 93]. The effectiveness of the environmentally-motivated ban on the export of charcoal from the ports of Berbera and Bosasso does show that even these weak systems have the ability to act when there is broad consensus on a problem and the decision can be enforced in the ports, where the authorities are strongest.

Ethiopian barriers to cross-border livestock trade reduce herder incomes, even if ultimately they are ineffective. A change in the tenor of international relations in the Horn of Africa and a realization that trade policies do not have to be zero-sum games would be necessary before progress could be made on this problem. There are scenarios to the grand political game in the Horn that might make this possible in the future, so continued education and discussion of this matter through IGAD-LPI sponsored forums is worthwhile.

All parties are agreed that the most important policy issue facing Somali livestock producers and traders are the animal health and certification issues that restrict exports into the Middle East. A disease certification process for live animal exports that is internationally convincing requires investment in an expanded and significantly restructured set of animal health systems. Traders are willing to pay for at least some of this, but have wanted advance assurances of profit and fear government misappropriation of the funds to other purposes, most especially to the youth in the militias/ armies. Some progress has been made by organizing the traders into national associations and more is possible through negotiations. Traders in Somaliland and Puntland will now be more motivated by competition from Djibouti. Nonetheless, a fully satisfactory solution to this problem area is likely to require some 'pump-priming' by donors. There are several competing initiatives underway to solve the animal health certification and export trade problems and it is unclear which one(s) will succeed in the long run. Most of these initiatives and their associated processes are highly political and the various livestock authorities must be the primary actors in the needed international discussions. Nonetheless, IGAD-LPI can create a foundation for such negotiations by creating region-wide forums in which analysis of the technical issues can be presented, discussed, and negotiated.

Related to the animal health issues are those of veterinary pharmaceuticals. There are serious problems with poor quality products being sold throughout the region and good quality ones being unavailable in too many areas. The best solution to poor quality pharmaceuticals would be a regulatory one, but this would require cooperative action throughout the IGAD region. Short of regulation, it may be possible to educate both pharmaceutical vendors who are permanent in a locality and the herder who patronize them that long-term trading partners can come to recognize and reward quality, consistency and reliability. IGAD-LPI could play a part both in facilitating the educational thrust and promoting regional negotiations on regulation, as this would not be controversial between member states.

Overall, donors, Somali authorities, and trader associations are already working on the policy issues on which progress is possible at present. The role that IGAD-LPI can most usefully play is to create regional forums in which these issues can be addressed across borders by technical staff, traders and herders. In the long run this can create the shared knowledge and perspectives that will be foundational to hoped-for international negotiations in the future. IGAD-LPI provides one of the few venues where Somali livestock production issues can be addressed across the boundaries of the six political entities that divide its ecosystem.

INTRODUCTION

At least six political entities contain citizens of Somali ethnicity and make policies that affect their livestock production – the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), Puntland (which nominally acknowledges the TFG but effectively sets its own policies), Somaliland (whose claim of sovereignty has not been recognized internationally), Djibouti (which includes people of Afar as well as Somali ethnicity), Region V of Ethiopia (the 'Somali National Regional State'), and the North-Eastern Province of Kenya. Since Somali herders and traders move constantly across the boundaries of these entities, making it a single economic zone, we need to consider their collective effects, not just their discrete ones.

Collectively the Somalis are the driving force behind the largest amount of overseas trade in livestock products in the Greater Horn (i.e., the north-east) of Africa. Kenya may have the most vibrant livestock production system in the region but virtually all of its milk is traded domestically. And the non-Somali pastoralists of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda have substantial herds, but most of these are marketed within the region. Only the Somalis and some northeastern Sudanese are involved in substantial livestock trade outside of Africa and the former are the primary drivers in access to the lucrative markets of the Middle East [FN: 96]1. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda comprise the membership of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Thus when it comes to international livestock trade, the problems of the Somalis are problems of IGAD.

The political economy of livestock production in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya is addressed in other studies in this series. This paper focuses on the political economy of the four political systems that occupied the territory of the former Republic of Somalia in late 2006.2 But it will place that analysis in the context of the larger set of states that govern the Somali people and their animals. The paper is based on a month of fieldwork and on extensive consultation of relevant publications and documents. Over forty interviews were conducted. The names of those interviewed are not given, as the political situation in the area makes confidentiality essential. Unfortunately, at the time the field research was undertaken the military conflict in the south of Somalia made it impossible for the author to do work there and he was confined to Somaliland and Puntland. However, in the 1980s he had consulted in the Bay Region and Mogadishu, so he is not unfamiliar with that area and he also interviewed Somalis in Nairobi who are active there. Further, he was very fortunate to be able to draw on the publications of the War-torn Societies Project International [2001, 2004, 2005], which are based on a very extensive set of consultations it conducted in Puntland, Somaliland and to a lesser extent elsewhere in the former Republic of Somalia.

[1] Designates the page number in the author's field notes on confidential interviews.
[2] The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which governed southern Somalia in late 2006, will be considered even though it ceased to exist in January 2007.

PART I: SOMALI GEOGRAPHY, PRODUCTION AND TRADE

As is well known, most of the territories occupied by Somalis are arid or semi-arid. Only in the area between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers in the south of Somalia do they engage in substantial amounts of sedentary agriculture. The Somali livestock production system is overwhelmingly transhumant, with herders moving their stock to access seasonal pastures and water points. Because the nature of these resources varies from year to year, as does the need for them, and because they are left unoccupied for substantial periods between uses, conflicts over access to them are common and sometimes deadly. While a herder is away, lands he is accustomed to using may be occupied by other herders or farmers and in a bad year it may be a matter of life or death whether or not he is able to reclaim them [Devereux, 2006, pp. 11, 15, 106-10].

Somali herds will be composed of, camels, cattle, sheep and goats but in the south the cattle predominate, whereas in the more arid north and northeast it is small ruminants. Historically, Somali cattle in northeast Kenya were exported out of Kismayu and Mogadishu to the Middle East. But the conflicts in these ports and the increased demand for beef in urban Kenya have reversed this flow, so that now these cattle are moving overland to Nairobi and are being joined by Somali stock from southern Somalia [Food Security Analysis Unit – Somalia, 2006; Little in Besteman and Cassanelli, 1996, Little, Teka, and Azeze. 2001; Little, 2005]. Both Somalis and the Government of Kenya are happy with this trade [FN: 8, 23].

The northern ports of Berbera and Bosasso predominately handle small ruminants, most of which will have grazed at least part of the year in Region V of Ethiopia. There are substantial variations in the volumes going through these ports, ranging from a high of approximately 3,500,000 head in 1995 and 1997 and a low of 750,000 in 2001 (when the Saudis imposed a ban on their import for health reasons) [Devereux, 2006, p. 59; Food Security Analysis Unit – Somalia, 2006]. Traders at these northern ports are adamant that the small ruminants and camels they export are 'Somali', whether or not they have been bought in Ethiopia. This conception is vigorously contested by Ethiopia, which regards them as 'Ethiopian' if they grazed there at all and wants to control their export, whether live by sea through Djibouti, Berbera or Bosasso or by air as chilled meat. The same Somali traders regard the more modest number of cattle they receive from Ethiopia to be 'Oromiya' and hence legitimately 'Ethiopian'. These views of the 'nationality' of livestock have considerable consequence in discussions about how to manage and improve livestock trade in the region [FN: 54].

Livestock trade is quite important to the welfare of ordinary Somali herders [Devereux, 2006, p. 11-12, 17]. Abdi Samatar questions the extent to which really good prices in the international market filter back to the pastoralist producers [1989, pp. 124-26], but other observers are convinced Gulf and local prices are at least correlated [FN: 74, 85]. Whatever the degree to which traders pass on good prices, there can be no doubt that the ability of traders to sell in and beyond the immediate region contributes centrally to Somali livelihoods. Thus the analysis below will be highly sensitive to trade-related issues.

PART II: THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE FORMER REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA

Somalia has not met the standard text-book definition of statehood since President Siad Barre fled the country in 1991 [Perouse de Monclos, 2001]. Max Weber defined a state as an organization that is able to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate exercise of force within defined territorial boundaries [1947, p. 156]; and over the last 15 years no claimant to the mantle of succession in the domain of the Republic of Somalia has met those criteria. Instead the territory has been dominated by fragmentation and conflict, largely based on allegiances to clans, warlords and now religion. Most of the country had been controlled by clan-affiliated warlords and their privately financed militias, who were backed by individual big businessmen and fought one another for control of the places from which they could extract economic rents. [Lewis, 2002.] Somaliland is in the northwest of what was Somalia, declared itself independent in 1991 [WSP, 2005, p. 14], has the organizational structure of a state but is still contesting sovereignty over Sool and Sanaag in its east with Puntland [WSP, 2004, p. 22; FN: 39, 96] and cannot conduct elections there. Puntland is in the northeast and established a weak governmental structure in 1998 [WSP, 2001, p. 11] but in late 2006 was fighting to retain control of Galkayo and the territory to its south in Mudug. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) had expanded its control to the coastal southern areas of the country in late 2006, but it had yet to create an organizational apparatus for state functions beyond its military and the Islamic courts. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed out of negotiations in Kenya in 2004 [WSP, 2004, p. 2] and with Ethiopian assistance displaced the UIC in January 2007. Nominally it holds the allegiance of all of the former Republic of Somalia, save Somaliland. In practice it is little more than a group of former warlords and their delegates sitting as ministers. In late 2006 it controlled only the territory around Baidoa (Bay Region), and Puntland backed it. It now has control of all the south but forces associated with the UIC and others contest its authority, particularly in Mogadishu and Kismayu [OCHA, 2007]. (See map, Appendix A.)

It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate on which of these entities will survive into the future, in what form and with what international alliances. Other sources, most notably the International Crisis Group [e.g., ICG, 2005], are much better informed on these issues.

It is unlikely, however, that the particular victor in the grand geo-political contest over sovereignty in the former Republic of Somalia matters very much for livestock policy and the welfare of Somali herders. Obviously peace would be hugely positive and in that sense it matters whether or not the 'grand game' reaches a final, stable solution. As stable state structures emerge to govern the Somalis, the transaction costs and risks of engaging in livestock trade diminish quite significantly [FN: 5, 13, 20, 33]. All the contending entities offer such a peace benefit, however. And when it comes to stopping violent conflict over water and grazing on the savannah, none of them are likely to be able to deliver dramatic changes, for neither the colonial powers in the past nor Kenya in the present (whose 'stateness' is unquestioned) established an effective monopoly of force in the pastoral hinterland.

In other aspects as well the effective livestock policy of all these entities would almost certainly be similar. Puntland, Somaliland and the TRG take approximately the same positions on the critical issues around trade, disease control and environmental degradation. The UIC did not have a ministry or even a spokesman for livestock issues, but it is hard to see its position differing from the other three parties. Indeed on charcoal production (about which more later) the UIC enforced the position of Puntland and Somaliland even without a ministry [FN: 95]. The warlords associated

with the TFG had not been able to put such a ban in place, and therefore there is a difference in implementation capacity, rather than policy, between the entities at present, with Somaliland and then Puntland being the best. This difference is one of practical realities, not of intention, however, and it could change if the situation in the south improves.

The status of the 'grand game' at any given point matters greatly for diplomacy and constrains many international actors. This paper will pass over these macro-political issues, however, and focus instead on the issues of governance at the domestic level that exist today and will persist into the future, no matter who wins.. What are the underlying social structures and the problems facing production and trade? How has order been maintained, production pursued and trade conducted in this chaotic setting?

PART III: HOW IS 'EVERYDAY ORDER' CREATED IN 'CHAOS'?

It is an error to conclude that just because the Republic of Somalia is no longer functioning and because there are warlords and various types of factions in control of much of its territory, that therefore anarchy reigns. In industrialized states there are very few governance institutions between the individual and the state, so that in them the collapse of the state really does threaten anarchy. But in Somalia the reach of the state was never complete and governance institutions that pre-existed it have continued to persist or have been resurrected in the last fifteen years. These 'traditional' institutions have been stressed by the persistence of violent conflict in much of the territory the Somali people occupy. But they continue to provide a powerful frame for human behavior. As Manor [2007: 3-15] and his colleagues have found, even in fragile states surprising levels of constructive local potential survive conflict. Local institutions may be damaged by conflict but they do better than national ones. No new state entity ever creates its governing institutions from a tablula rasa; it must instead respond not only to patterns of individual interests but also to persisting structures of non-state governance as well. If we are to understand the political economy of the present and future political entities of the Somalis, these persistent structures must be presented, analyzed and weighted.

Outside observers all too frequently bring to the Somalis not only Western expectations about the functioning of state and society but Western philosophical baggage about the state as well. It is surprising how often even journalists and aid workers cite the 17th century proposition of Thomas Hobbes that without the state, there is war "of every man against every man" and life is "nasty, brutish and short" [1651, Chap. 13] This philosophical proposition derives from certain fundamental axioms about human behavior that were questioned even in that epoch by another great social contract theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau [1992 [1755]; 2001 [1762]]. It is worth revisiting those assumptions in the Somali context, because if we are going to reason about our projections for the future, we must be sure that our axioms are appropriate. This discussion of the foundational principles of political order among the Somalis is organized around Hobbes and Rousseau, not out of philosophical interest but because their attention to precisely these issues provides a convenient way of organizing the exploration.

Hobbes assumed that the universal (cross-cultural) and primary (coming before all others) motive of human beings is personal survival. But this fundamental assumption of his analysis was philosophically, not empirically rooted. It was derived and modified from the work of Grotius [Tuck, 1989, pp. 68- 74]. Rousseau, challenged the Hobbesian axiom, by insisting that it was too individualistic (Wokler, 2001, pp. 54, 56, 74; O'Hagen, 1999, p. 101). He followed Aristotle in asserting that sociability is fundamental to humanity as well, that the generation of wealth requires collective, not just individual activity, and that humans have a natural propensity for empathy toward others when it doesn't conflict with their direct self-interests.

Evans-Pritchard's monograph on the Nuer did provide colonial-era data on behavior in a stateless society. Contrary to the Hobbesian expectation he did not find a 'war of all against all'. This classic piece of social anthropology concludes that pervasive inter-group conflict among the Nuer is avoided through the negotiating prowess and religious authority of the 'leopard skin chiefs' [1940]. Robert Bates has provided a reinterpretation of the Evans-Pritchard data and asserts that order instead is provided by the mutual deterrence of 'tit-for-tat' retaliatory behavior by kinship groups [1983, Chap. 1].

We also have the observations of I.M. Lewis in A Pastoral Democracy [1998 [1961], pp. 6, 28, 163, 168-70, 228- 32] on statelessness among the Somali in colonial British

Somaliland. His research doesn't fit either Hobbes or Rousseau perfectly: – The state probably does protect urban dwellers from violence better than other forms of political organization, but neither colonial nor contemporary states in the Greater Horn of Africa have done an adequate job of protecting pastoralists in the savannah. In the absence of effective security from states, Somalis have not engaged in a 'war of all against all' but instead have sought protection from kinship groups. Lewis's findings are less optimistic than those of Evans-Pritchard (even though he was taught by him) nor do they confirm Bates' thesis about the universal efficacy of tit-for-tat retaliation as a solution to inter-group conflict. According to Lewis the payment of 'blood money' by Somali dia-paying groups may prevent the escalation of conflict, when that is what most of the segmentary lineage wants instead of revenge. But it doesn't stop the existence of considerable inter-personal violence in the system nor the callous disregard by dominant lineages of 'blood money' demands from weaker ones.

There is something fundamental about kinship as a building block for social order. We shortly will see that clan groups emerged as the building blocks for renegotiating civil order in Somaliland and Puntland. But we also will see, finally, that as the power of clan groups was recognized they came to be subverted by warlords and businessmen, thereby demanding a new level and form of organization for creating security.

Hobbes was wrong and Rousseau was right about the fundamental sociability of humanity. People in the absence of the state and civil order do not seek to maximize their personal chances of survival or of individual wealth. Childless young men are even the least cautious about their own lives and seem to be highly oriented toward their immediate social groups in their fighting and material accumulation strategies. Military sociologists have long told us that soldiers do not risk their lives for God [an abstract ideology], country [another social abstraction] or glory, but out of solidarity with, and to maintain the respect of, their peers in their immediate fighting unit. Similarly sociologists and anthropologists studying Africa tell us that people seek wealth, at least in the first instance, in order to meet the social obligations to their kin which they have accumulated while growing up and that they subsequently use it to purchase status in their communities [Marie, 1997, p. 416; Berry, 1993].

Thus wealth is not particularly valuable in its own right but instead is an instrument for extending, consolidating and gaining status within one's social network. And survival, which certainly is highly valued, will often be put at risk for the sake of this same network. Indeed, in most of the developing world and certainly in Africa, the kinship group is not in conflict with personal survival but is seen as the basic unit through which it is achieved [Elias in Marie, 1997, p. 415].

The question, then, is not whether humans are fundamentally and primarily social animals (a la Aristotle, they are), but what is the fundamental character of the social network to which they owe their allegiance. Are we looking at something like Richard Dawkins's Selfish Gene [1976], in which human behavior at the extremes is designed to assure the survival and prosperity of those most like ourselves genetically? Or do humans socially construct the groups to which they pledge 'their lives and their sacred honor'? The general evidence tends toward 'social construction' of identity, but under conditions of great stress, when survival is most threatened, the metaphor (although most often not the strict substance) of the 'selfish gene' is operative.

The large literature on race and ethnicity, not to speak of nationality, demonstrates that these superficially 'genetic' identities are as much or more cultural than biological constructs. They are artificial creations and do not need to have even an ostensible genetic root, as we can see in many forms of religious and other ideological convictions [Fearon and Laitin, 2000]. On the other hand, as we have witnessed the dramatic breakdown of social order in many places in the last century, it is striking that most often the 'reversion' unit for survival and coping is the extended family. In Somalia the structures of intra- and inter-clan governance had been seriously eroded by Italian colonialism (less so by British). They seemed to survive largely as 'socially constructed' identities — real in their social consequences but for a great many

Somalis in the south of the country, lacking very much in social structure. Nonetheless when the Somali state collapsed and people were threatened with lives that were 'nasty, brutish and short' (as Hobbes would have it) the entire segmentary lineage system of clan governance sprung back into life and became the fundamental organizing principle for attempts at civil order.

The preceding thesis of reversion under great stress to the social Darwinian evolutionary principle of struggle to perpetuate the 'gene pool' must be qualified, however. First, even a segmentary lineage system (one which builds units of loyalty outward from the nuclear family on the basis of degree of biological relationship) is socially constructed in Somalia, for it is based on only patrilineal decent. Since Africa also has matrilineal decent systems (e.g., southern Ghana) it is clear that this way of defining and qualifying lineage is a product of culture, not just biology. The family as a motivating force thus seems to be more of a metaphor [Lakoff, 2002] and thus a socially constructed ideology for motivating behavior, with a powerful but only loose association with the instinct to protect one's kin. For example, Bernhard Helander asserts that a majority of the Hubeer clan in the inter-riverine area of southern Somalia probably are members by adoption, not descent, but that this does not alter their behavior [in Besteman & Cassanelli 1996, pp. 50-51].

A system of governance organized around segmentary lineage provides a social structure for negotiating relationships among groups, but it has its limits. It can give relationships regularity and reduce violence by creating structures of deterrence. Commerce does extraordinarily well, using the clan system and Islamic sheria courts with agility to build trust and enforceable contracts (even across clans) [FN: 33, 51].

In Somaliland and then in Puntland the end of civil war and the creation of new constitutions were negotiated through clans. In circumstances in which it was very difficult and divisive to hold elections, legislative representatives in both authorities were designated in clan proceedings. The dominant lower house in Somaliland moved on in 2005 to representatives elected directly by the citizenry but in Puntland clan representation is still used. [FN: 52] (For a map of the predominant clans in the various parts of Somali area see map Appendix B [Lewis 1998].)

But the clans are weak at imposing order, especially on those who are willing to ignore or abuse the system. Among the Somali all adult males participate in the base level of clan deliberations and decisions are made by consensus. Even where the clan structures are strong, as in the north, north-east and Belet Weyne, it is difficult to impose burdens for the collective good that do not command nearly universal consent. And, of course, clan governance is a weak instrument for dealing with supra-clan problems. Especially in the south, as the political significance of clan institutions has become clear, they have been penetrated by the patronage of warlords and big businessmen, thus harming their integrity and effectiveness. [FN: 45, 78] Some believe that the clans were manipulated and bought in the creation of the TFG, compromising the legitimacy of the latter. On the southern coast clans were able to do no more than create truces between warlords and have limited ability to resist the warlords and Islamists.

Military predation and the inter-group warring that goes with it prompt one to reflect on the history of state formation in Europe. A number of years ago Charles Tilly [1992] suggested that in its early stages the state looked more like the protection rackets of organized crime than some great project for the social good -- peasant and merchant communities provided for their own social order and 'state builders' imposed themselves on these basic units in a manner that was frequently predatory and initially did not add much social value. Groups that had a choice between communal autonomy and the 'protection' of a proto-state generally preferred the former [Magagna, 1991]. In Africa what people under disorder seem to want most is not that the warlords and their youth militias create states but that they stop fighting over the top of them, cease predating on their commerce, and leave them alone to lineage and religious systems of order.

Hobbes felt that the state was a prerequisite to the creation of property and wealth (1651, Chap. 13). Rousseau hypothesized instead that states were formed in order to protect wealth and inequality (e.g., Wokler, 2001, p. 51). Although most social theory has sided with Hobbes in seeing civil order as a prerequisite to capitalist growth (North, 1990), the experience of the Somalis has been closer to Rousseau's expectation. As the state collapsed Somali businessmen exploded into extraordinary income-seeking efforts. The general populace has been impoverished by the conflicts of the warlords, but certain types of big businessmen have prospered from the removal of state controls on their endeavors. If the states in Somalia are an outgrowth of 'organized crime' (a la Tilly), it is the big businessmen who are financing the predatory efforts of the warlords. Both may be preying on society; in any case we don't see warlords being terribly effective in taking advantage of rich traders. Of course, the extreme laissez-faire environment of Somalia probably made some forms of capitalist expansion easy at the expense of others. Those that have done best are those who engage in various forms of trade, turning the whole country into a kind of duty-free port. Business growth also may have been facilitated by the ability to 'park' capital in other, secure states, and has reached its limits now. Thus investments in fixed assets and production in Somalia proper are uncommon (save for mobile phone towers). [Nenova & Harford, 2004; Grosse-Ketler, 2004] Even in the livestock trade, the sanitary standards now being imposed by the Gulf states require collective action among traders that will be difficult to accomplish without more effective states, as we will see below[FN: 32]. Nonetheless, any simple assumption that statelessness is 'bad for business' cannot be sustained from the Somali evidence.

Inequalities of wealth pose large challenges to the ability of extended family/community systems to define and defend their 'general will', as expressed through the consensus of the assembly of adult males. Inequalities can stimulate predation -- not on the wealthy, who can hire others to defend them, but on the ability of people at the bottom to identify and pursue their common interests, distorted as they come to be by patron-client relations. The wealthy can provide jobs, handouts, and discrete benefits to individuals or small groups, thereby using patronage to command their support and leading them to sacrifice their collective interests (such as higher prices or peace) for the sake of (ultimately less valuable) private ones [Bates, 1981; Leonard, 2006; Migdal, 1974].

With the inability of the clans to bring peace to the south of Somalia, in 2006 we saw the emergence of a new form of Islam that made a very powerful ideological claim on society and had the ability to impose greater order than any secular social structure seemed able to create. Sociologists of religion have suggested that when death seems to become random and without regular cause, people have a strong need for spiritual beliefs and practices that will explain the inexplicable and give them some psychological tools for controlling the uncontrollable. Thus religious systems of order may be a natural part of the deep structure whereby people seek to bring environments of extreme danger under control and to create extra incentives for sociable behavior. Rousseau would have expected as much. He saw people being driven by value systems that were introduced early in life and received positive reinforcement well into adulthood [O'Hagen, 1999, p. 102]. In other words, he understood childhood socialization.

Religion and other ideologies serve to reinforce social behavior that considers entities beyond the extended family. The nature and boundaries of that social behavior are defined by the particular, socially constructed ideology used. We must assume that the incentives generated by these ideologies may be less powerful than those of the extended family but are strong enough that they must be considered in models of human behavior. Among the Somali, kinship is the first and foremost focus of

socialization, but Islam comes close behind and has the virtue, at least as much as language, of being a historical unifying force for them.3

With the weakening if not disintegration of state courts in some parts of the former Republic, Somalis have turned to sheria ones, as they always did for family law matters in any case. Together with the clans, these religious courts have provided an important element of order and through the enforcement of contracts have facilitated business, not only within the former Republic of Somalia but throughout the Muslim world. These courts were a natural rallying force as disdain for the warlords and disappointment at the stalled progress of the TFG grew. What made the UIC controversial, therefore, (even in Somaliland and Puntland) was not sheria itself but the question of which interpretation of sheria [WSP, 2004, p. 7; WSP, 2001, p. 68] and who lies behind it. Sheria courts are the primary form of adjudication in all the Somali polities, even in the TFG which overthrew the Islamist UIC.

Much of the UIC's finances are although to have come from Wahabi fundamentalists and an important minority within the movement was allied with al-Qaeda. At the leadership level it still seemed unclear as to who will hold the real reins of power, obviously a question of great importance to the Americans and Ethiopians. [ICG, 2005.] Somalis, particularly rural ones, are largely Sufis, however, a form of Islam held in disdain by Wahabis. The question of whether under the UIC the sheria courts would become fundamentalist or would remain traditional and more tolerant therefore seemed open to many observers in 2006. In addition, so far the UIC has been successful in gaining control only of territories in which the Hawiye clan family is predominant. The president of Puntland argued to his people that the UIC was part of a Hawiye plot to take over Somalia [FN: 23]. So whether or not clan issues would have merged with Islamist ones and how this would have affected the political future of the Somalis seemed unknown to many. Obviously the TFG and its Ethiopian and American allies became persuaded that the fundamentalists and those allied with al-Qaeda were predominant, leading them to unite in a military operation to overthrow the UIC. This decision has thrown the Mogadishu (and occasionally Kismayu) into civil war again.

For livestock producers and traders the most important results, no matter what the outcome of the UIC insurgency, are that Somali-wide policy is unlikely, that Puntland and Somaliland will remain crucial to livestock exports, and that effective livestock policy will depend on the TFG's finding a way to work with and through them.

The Somali experience does restructure much of the wisdom imparted to us by the social contract theorists. Statelessness does not automatically mean disorder, nor is it necessarily completely bad for business. The extended family, not anarchy, is the alternative to the state. But under extreme stress the effectiveness even of kinship units of survival will erode and be subject to the allied manipulations of the force of warlords and the patronage of big businessmen. When the politics of greed no longer is tolerable and the limits of the politics of kinship become evident, society is fertile soil for the implantation of ideologies that resonate with childhood socialization (such as religion) and can promise civil order.

Such are the larger social structures within which Somali politics is conducted. We turn now to the actors — the lineages, the economic interests and the religious ideologies which act upon and drive the making of livestock policy among the Somali.

[3] There are two dialects of Somali: Sab and Saawale, but the most persistent focus of resistance to colonialism was Islam [Lewis, 2002, pp. 13- 14, Chap. IV].

PART IV: KEY SOMALI POLITICAL GROUPS ON LIVESTOCK ISSUES

Clans

Description of the social functioning of these lineage groups in Somalia and there is no need to reproduce his account here [1998 [1961]]

The Somali have a segmentary lineage system and their social groups are based at various breaks in the line of male descent. Somalis can trace their patrilineal line for up to 30 generations. The broadest lineage grouping is the clan family, which has symbolic and political significance but no organization. One progresses to ever-smaller groupings – the clan, the sub-clan, the sub-sub-clan and finally the dia-paying group. The last is the unit that handles claims for and payment of compensation for injuries. I.M Lewis provides the classic and authoritative There is frequent reference to the 'clan elders' in Somali politics but the meaning of the term varies by level. At the dia-paying level it simply denotes the collection of adult male members. At clan level it designates an ugas, 'sultan', or other hereditary, more-or-less honorary leader, who rarely plays a political role. Next in line would be people, such as a nabadoon in the south or a beeldaajie in Puntland, selected by the community to negotiate peace between lineage groups, to administer customary law (xeer), and to preside over the assembly of elders. Again, this type of role is facilitative rather than authoritative. Unless their standing has been eroded by too partisan a role in politics, these positions usually have enough influence to enforce judgments. But this is due to persuasion and legitimacy, not control of force. [FN: 76.]

Technically all adult males have the right of participation at any level of lineage assembly. Beyond this level of 'universal suffrage', 'clan elders' is a loose term connoting those who command respect in their communities and have been suggested to represent the lineage in some kind of representative function. They need not reside in the community proper and might even be self-made businessmen or from the diaspora. [FN: 76.]

The clan elders in the sense of representatives and conciliators are responsible for the success of Somaliland today. They sold the idea of disarmament to the clans and negotiated the representation of other clans. They play a similar but lesser role in Puntland. But in the south their authority has been eroded by their being co-opted into partisan political combat. [FN:77-78, 95.]

In the north and northeast legislative representatives had been nominated from the sub-sub clan, highly contested and then selected at a higher, senior elder level. This is still true for Puntland and the TFG. In Somaliland the selection of legislative representatives has moved from sub-clan consensus to citizen secret ballot, and in doing so the coherence of the lineages has weakened. Individuals from different parties represent the same clan in the recently elected lower house in Somaliland. Although there certainly is an element of clan underlying political allegiances, the parties in the legislature are mixed by clan. [FN: 52-53, 77- 78, 98.] From this we can conclude that clan elders can be highly effective at conciliation and at representation on issues that are not internally divisive, but that the effectiveness of the institution breaks down if it is used for partisan competition or to impose (rather than negotiate) settlements. Clan elders can help to negotiate consensus on issues of livestock policy but they don't act by majority rule and they can't impose a decision on an organized group.

Traders

At the most basic level this term represents the collection of people who perform a trading function in Somali society. This includes people who have little or no capital of their own and act as agents or guarantors (jeeble and dilaal) for those who do international trading. Then there are those who trade for themselves in local markets. [Peter Little in Besteman and Cassanelli, 1996, pp. 101- 05.] But our interest here is in those who engage in export and import trade internationally. Freed from the regulatory repression of the Barre regime, Somali business has undergone explosive growth, so that Somalis are the dominant traders in the region and control major finance and transport systems as well. Far from being at the mercy of the warlords in the disintegrated Somali state, they have frequently emerged as their patrons. Politics within the Somali political systems is heavily influenced by these individuals, who are able to use their resources to purchase protection, personal consideration, elected offices, and policy attention. Their hand could be seen in the debates about the new Veterinary Code in Somaliland and they control the port of Bosasso [FN: 50, 57, 87]. On the other hand, traders are not a unified block — they compete intensely with each other, and as international markets shift and reward different sets of personal connections, new traders become dominant [FN: 85]. Although Somali trade did extremely well when freed of the regulation and economic repression of Barre, it seems now to have reached the limits of what pure laissez-faire can deliver (if laisser-faire also includes the unregulated purchase of war-lord power). There are a number of areas, particularly in livestock exports, where public goods are needed for the next stages in economic development, and traders do not find it easy to enforce collective action on one another without some kind of state-like authority. On the other hand, the proto-state political systems of Puntland and Somaliland have a difficult time when they do attempt to enforce regulations on this group. The political actions of this group and of the Somali diaspora politicians fit well into a patron-client model of politics. [Leonard, 2006]

Diaspora

Given the instability and insecurity of life in Somalia proper over the last 15 years, large numbers of Somalis have spread out over the globe seeking economic opportunity and safety. The remittances provided by this diaspora are critical to the welfare of a very large number of Somali families [Medani, 2003]. In addition, the economic and intellectual leadership of this group play surprisingly large roles in Somali politics. Over half the cabinet ministers in the various Somali governments are from the diaspora and hold double passports. Approximately half the elected members of the Somaliland lower house are highly educated and rich individuals from the diaspora. [FN: 52.] The fact that these individuals are chosen to represent their clans is a sign of the respect in which they are held by those left behind, but it also often is a consequence of the resources they have contributed in the past or are expected to bring in the future to their communities. The dynamics here too are of a patron-client variety. Unlike the traders, diaspora leaders may not have self-regarding or even mutually-consistent agendas, but their policy positions can be independent of anything the electors expected in selecting them. As a group they are not tied to the interests of their constituents in herding. But it also is true that only some of them are traders. They are a weighty but ultimately unpredictable element in livestock policy.

Warlords

A variety of clans and parties were instrumental in the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991. The militias they formed were not a unified force and once Barre had fled they fell to fighting with one another for control of territory and revenues. The most valuable terrain was and is that which contains the major ports, for the most important tax revenues in Somalia always came from duties on imports and exports. In addition those who controlled a port could determine who was able to trade through it and gain commercial advantage in the markets it served. Thus many of the warlords were financed by important businessmen [WSP, 2004, p. 10].

Tragically, the material interests of the warlords and their business partners were better served by the collection of 'economic rents' than by enhancing the productivity of the general population. In Somaliland the local military leaders in the overthrow of Barre (even if they were clan-based) handed over rule to a civilian government after the Burao meeting of the region's elders, intellectuals and politicians in order to declare the secession of Somaliland from the Somali Republic. In Puntland the warlords at least were able to gain enough control to assure peace to those who inhabited and used their territory. But in the south and particularly in Mogadishu, control and thus peace has been elusive.

The era of the warlords seems now to be fast waning. Although the current and past presidents of Puntland were commanders of militias, the north and northeast territories have transformed themselves into proto-states. The warlords of the southern coast, as a result of their failure to bring peace and security, have now been displaced or subordinated by the Union of Islamic Courts. Some warlords remain as ministers in the TFG, but their base is insecure. The interests of those who delivery both security and insecurity are in the promotion of trade and in extracting taxes and trade advantages from their control of it.

Rootless Young Soldiers

After a decade and a half of civil war it should come as no surprise that a substantial portion of Somali young men are engaged in paramilitary activities. None of the Somali political systems are secure and stable enough to demobilize the militias in which these men serve, and their upkeep consumes considerable resources. Even in Somaliland, where the militias have been absorbed into a fairly disciplined army, over 70% of all monies collected by the government go to the 'security services' [FN: 93]. If these young men are poorly paid, as they have been in the TFG and Puntland, they may prove unreliable in combat or spend their extra hours setting up rogue roadblocks to extract money from commercial vehicles for their daily qat (a mild stimulant). It is thought that one of the reasons that the fighters for the Union of Islamic Courts were initially so effective and did not set-up roadblocks is that Middle East donors pay them substantially more than the forces of the other political actors in the region do [FN: 6]. One of the things that made the UIC very popular with traders, even those in the north and northeast, was that it did not allow its soldiers to 'tax' livestock being moved to the ports. Under the TFG a lorry moving up the south-north spine road would face 30 roadblocks and a total tariff of about $1000. These young men do not exert any direct influence on livestock policy. But indirectly they raise the transaction costs of trade and eat up the various governmental budgets (even in Somaliland) which might otherwise go toward animal disease control.

Herders

The pastoralists themselves are not well integrated into the political processes of the Somali political systems. Their votes are incorporated through patron-client relationships, which means they receive minor direct benefits but at the cost of very little consideration for the policies and infrastructure that would most serve their interests as producers. (For the general model for the effect of patron-client politics on agriculture, see Bates, 1981.) Fortunately, contemporary donor procedures favor consultation with intended beneficiaries, so that through this route the voices of livestock producers are better heard. (An example is the Horn of Africa Regional Pastoralist Gathering, which has met twice in Ethiopia [DFID, 2006].)

PART V: POLICIES AND OPTIONS

Despite a political environment that many consider wholly chaotic, Somalis have shown a remarkable ability to create a semblance of order in many parts of their territories, sustain livestock production, and expand their trade. Nonetheless, there are a number of areas in which the limits of initiative by individuals and small groups have been reached and on which there is broad consensus that something must be done to provide collective goods. Security, animal health services, the veterinary certification of livestock for export, government finances, trade across the Ethiopian borders, security of pastoral access to land and water, the regulation of veterinary pharmaceuticals, and the regeneration of commercial milk production are all issues that came up in our interviews and in other policy deliberations [WSP 2001, 2005]. In normal circumstances these all would be a priority for state-supported action. But times are not normal. Civil conflict and the future shape of the Somali polities are outside the frame of livestock policy even if they affect it profoundly and will be determined in a great geo-political game. Given the disorder in some of the Somali political entities and the weakness of the others, it also is not feasible to move forward on some other issues at this time.

Land Tenure

Pastoralists are able to make a living in environments that are so harsh as to be unusable by farmers. They do so through the great flexibility with which they use land and water, both seasonally and from year to year. [Devereux, 2006, pp. 11, 13.] When times are difficult and the resources needed for their livestock are scarce, pastoralists always have come into conflict with each other. One of the prime functions of the clan-based and dia-paying systems discussed above is to negotiate these conflicts and keep them from getting out of control. These groups perform this function reasonably well, although doubtless a strong and supportive state, in principle, could assist them in providing still greater security and resource reliability. In practice, however, the government of Siad Barre actually facilitated moves by wealthy and politically well-connected individuals to take over control of lands that were part of traditional production systems and such grabs remain a danger today [Besteman & Cassanelli, 1996, Chap. 1; FN 30]. Another danger is that sedentary producers will take over lands that are marginally viable for their production systems but that provide dry-season grazing and water for pastoralists and therefore are crucial to their livelihoods. This danger is most acute in the lowlands of Ethiopia, where the government is encouraging permanent settlements and irrigated agriculture along the river banks [Halderman, 2005]. A similar dynamic is present in the semi-arid lands of Kenya and this conflict is an issue in some parts of the former Republic of Somalia as well. There are ways to address these issues outside the usual conception of land as a wholly-owned commodity. For example, in the areas between the Juba and Shabelle Rivers sedentary and nomadic Somalis traditionally have had seasonal rights to shared lands, with agriculturalists growing crops in the rains and pastoralists feeding their animals on the stubble and providing manure to the same fields in the dry season. There may be scope to discuss many of these land tenure and related water access issues on an IGAD-wide basis, such as in the Regional Pastoralist Gatherings [DFID, 2006]. None of the Somali political entities have a sufficiently powerful presence in the rural areas to enforce central decisions, however and therefore lack the capacity to regulate these issues at the moment. The one vehicle that may be available are the sheria courts, which are particularly adept at addressing

inter-personal disputes from an equity perspective and which are rooted in the communities themselves.

Water

Water also is crucial to the viability of pastoralism. When considering natural water sources, the issues are the same as they are for land. Water adds a wrinkle when private watering points are constructed, effectively creating access to new lands in the dry season. When boreholes and water-harvesting berkedo are placed too close together, competitive grazing and degradation of the range takes place [WSP, 2001, pp. 206-18]. Somalis recognize this as a problem today, but the current political entities in the former Somalia lack the capacity to impose their authority in the more remote areas, as would be necessary to deal with this problem.

Trade and the Ethiopian Border

By and large Somali livestock producers are not self-sufficient. They must sell animals into the market in order to purchase items that are crucial to their survival [WSP, 2001, p. 131]. The trade in livestock is international in two senses – first, the final destination of the largest number of small ruminants is the Middle East and Kenya for cattle; second, since Somali pastoralists cross international borders in order to access grazing, the animals they sell also have to cross borders to reach markets. For those in the south of the former Republic of Somalia, who sell into the Nairobi market, crossing the Kenya border is not a great problem at present. For those Somali animals that have grazed much of the year in Ethiopia, however, the border crossing is more contested. The Government of Ethiopia takes great issue at the idea that animals that have fed on Ethiopian pastures are being sold into international markets without passing through official Ethiopian marketing channels and therefore without generating any tax revenue for the state [Little, 2005; Little, Teka and Azeze, 2001; FN: 9]. The issue is all the greater because traders usually purchase livestock with in-kind goods that have been imported from the Gulf [WSP, 2001, pp. 130- 31]. Thus both export and import revenues are being lost and the Government of Ethiopia considers this trade 'smuggling', even thought they are moving within a traditional, integrated Somali eco-system. The Ethiopian military (which Somalis say is bribe-proof [FN: 33]) is able to interrupt the movement of traders across the border, but it can't stop the movement of the animals themselves. Since the pastoral production system crosses the border, a herder or small trading agent is easily able to move stock from Ethiopia to the waiting trucks of Somali traders across the border [FN: 20]. This trade is unstoppable; but the Ethiopian attempts to interdict it impose costs on the herders themselves, for they have to move to the traders rather than the other way around. Since the traders (who are politically powerful) do not bear the cost themselves, they do not have much motive to urge their political authorities to negotiate a share of tax revenues with Ethiopia and end the harassment. The herders who bear the burden have little political influence at present.

There has been some improvement in the last few years that to the FAO EXCELEX project (of which more later). The project established a protocol for livestock marketing through an examination and certification process for animals destined for export from Ethiopia through Somalia. These arrangements included letters of credit for Somali traders and tax payments at the border before crossing to Somalia, thereby legalizing the border trade and easing the contraband issue to some extent. Traders find this process for getting letters of credit burdensome, however, and the mechanism doesn't allow for trade-in-kind for goods imported (without duty) through

Somali ports from the Middle East. This policy problem is not likely to be resolved at present, as long as it tackled in isolation. As we will see below, however, it may be addressable within the larger context of Ethiopia's need to secure its access to ports, new competition to Berbera and Bosasso from Djibouti, and the animal health requirements of livestock trade into the Gulf.

Despite the limitations just noted on taking policy initiatives on some crucial issues, the Somali systems have shown a surprising capacity for collective action in some circumstances. One of these concerns environmental degradation.

Charcoal and Deforestation

The collapse of the Republic of Somalia 15 years ago effectively ended most forms of economic regulation. Among those resources most severely impacted were the country's rangelands. Among other problems, people desperate for any form of income expanded the production of charcoal and sold it into the Saudi peninsula. The result was a loss of shade, fodder and soil stability in the range. [Awale, 2006.] As the magnitude of this problem was recognized Somaliland and Puntland banned the export of Somali charcoal from their ports. The Union of Islamic Courts stopped it from being shipped out of Mogadishu as well (for this port had continued as an outlet for southern charcoal production under the warlords). This is a very hopeful indication that even fragile systems may have the capability to regulate some threats to the collective good. Three key features of this intervention would seem to be that the problem was very widely-recognized, that there was no organized opposition to regulating it, and that the regulation could be accomplished at the ports, where it is easiest and the new governments have their strongest presence. [WSP, 2001, pp. 101, 179; WSP, 2005, pp. 206, 217, 259; FN: 5, 91, 95.]

Animal Health, Disease Control and Export Certification

The Somalis were trading livestock into the Saudi peninsula well before the colonial era and the most lucrative part of that trade was the supply of sheep and goats to Mecca for the Haj. Because of health concerns the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has imposed bans on Somali livestock imports three times – in the early 1980s, 1998, and since 2000 [FN: 25, 61-62; WSP, 2005, pp.220, 228]. Each time the ban has had a devastating effect on Somali traders and livestock producers, thereby galvanizing Somali attention to the actions necessary for ending it and regaining access to the Haj market. The bans were each prompted by some real or suspected disease affecting Somali animals, coupled with the inability of Somali animal health services to guarantee that the problem would not be exported to the Kingdom. Every interview or document that expressed a view about the priority issues facing Somali livestock production put this matter first on the list. It is a complicated one, involving the ways in which animal diseases impact ordinary Somali herders, the structure and reach of animal health services, the mechanics of preparing animals for export, the integrity of the animal health export certification process, and, of course, the interaction of politics and self-interest.

Somali sheep and goats are particularly popular in the Middle East, as they are the right size for a single-family feast and are considered tastier because of having been raised on the range, rather than in a feedlot. The major competition comes from Australian small ruminants, the availability of which varies with changes in world prices (to which Somalis are less susceptible, for they have access to fewer alternative markets).

There is no doubt that there are technical limitations in the export inspection processes in the Somali ports and in the animal health systems that stand behind them. There also are legitimate worries behind the disease concerns raised by the Saudis [FN: 38, 84], even if some of them seem wrongly placed on Somali shoulders. Many Somalis and the experts who work with them doubt that the Saudi bans were prompted wholly by health or other technical concerns. The Saudi import inspection standards and processes are far from transparent, and some suspect they are driven by well-placed Saudis who have personal financial interests in alternative channels of supply. For example, it is thought that members of the Saudi royal family own Australian sheep ranches and that others have a prominent stake in abattoirs in Ethiopia [FN: 16]. The reopening of the Djibouti (Somali and Afar) port to exports for the Haj in late 2006 came when a new holding ground for quarantine was built and its control was ceded to a Saudi entrepreneur [Brass, 2007]. The Saudis also close their eyes to the fact that the same small ruminants refused entry to their ports are being sold to Yemenis and then walked into the Kingdom, transferring substantial profits from Somali traders to Yemeni ones who are better connected in Saudi [FN: 25; WSP, 2005, p. 228- 29, 237]. It is impossible to know the truth of these allegations from research among the Somali, but the Somaliland Minister of Livestock has become convinced that the Saudi market is unreliable and that the country is better off working to open up other markets for itself elsewhere in the Middle East [FN: 61]. Nonetheless, to access even those markets and to retain the markets that Somalis already have in the Emirates and Oman, the ports of Berbera (Somaliland) and Bosasso (Puntland) will have to provide better assurances that diseased animals are not being exported [FN: 60, 84].

How are Somalis to assure that livestock meet World Animal Health Organization (OIE) Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) standards (or even lesser ones of many of its trading partners) when none of the Somali political systems has a strong state veterinary system and in some of them it is hardly functioning at all? There are three aspects of this problem:

a. Procedural. The OIE insists that the safety of the livestock and animal products be certified through a chain of formal authority that ends in an OIE-recognized Chief Veterinary Officer for the country. Since the only internationally-recognized state in the territory of the former Republic of Somalia is the TFG and since it is little more than a group of ministers with no real bureaucracy and in any case has no authority in Somaliland, this requirement is all but impossible to meet under present circumstances.

   Countries such as Yemen and the Emirates, which are anxious to buy Somali livestock, may overlook this procedural problem by accepting the certificates of the port veterinary officers. But these are readily subject to challenge, sometimes legitimately so, as they are financed by and subject to influence by the traders themselves. Fraudulent certificates were said to be a problem out of Bosasso (Puntland), where traders have dominant influence over the government, but less so from Berbera (Somaliland) [FN: 31, 59, 64]. (On the other hand, a risk-averse trader would not want to get his livestock all the way to a foreign port and have them declared diseased on arrival. The animals would be blocked at that point and the trader would have the considerable expense of figuring out what to do with them. Thus the greater the distance a trader is shipping his stock the more he risks a disease outbreak if the inspections are not genuine [FN: 26].)

   Of course Djibouti and Ethiopia are internationally recognized and therefore can provide accepted certificates of health. Use of Djibouti involves substantially greater distances and transport costs for most Somali, however, so this is not an attractive option for most herders. The traders of Berbera and Bosasso also are shut out of Djibouti, so they have a strong incentive to discover alternative mechanisms for certification.

b. Substantive. How can an inspection at portside assure that there are no diseased animals in a herd or flock? For certain hard-to-detect conditions laboratory tests can be conducted economically to determine infection. At the insistence of the Gulf states, both Berbera and Bosasso provide such a test for brucellosis. Where laboratory tests are not feasible or economic (as is the case for most diseases) an animal could already be infected at the time of inspection but the symptoms are not yet visible unless there has been an extended quarantine. In these conditions unless the inspector knows the history of the animal's care for a certain period of time, even an honest certificate cannot provide the assurance that the international system expects. Unless disease surveillance, emergency disease control and certification are integrated, certification is not highly reliable [FN: 84, 94]. How far back does this disease surveillance and control need to go? Negotiations with current and potential destination ports in the Gulf at the moment are calling for a month of controlled observation in a disease-free environment. But OIE regulations as applied in Europe would require a year of observation in a zone or even a country that can be certified as disease-free.

   Djibouti ostensibly offers a solution to this problem as far as the Saudi trade is concerned. It has installed a large holding ground with a 21-day quarantine. As Djibouti has almost no fodder at hand, however, the economic viability (and perhaps the reality) of such quarantine is in doubt [Brass, 2007]. Of course this solution also does nothing for the Somali traders of Berbera and Bosasso.

c. Implementation. If one is to have a system of veterinary surveillance and disease control, how is it to be financed? Somali herders have little demand for animal health services for animals that are intended for their own or local consumption [FN: 92]. Local traditional stock are quite disease resistant and are raised in arid and semi-arid conditions where some say there is less danger of fatal infection. Rinderpest is now rare; Foot and Mouth is not fatal; it is possible quickly to slaughter and eat animals with Anthrax; and worms reduce the size of the animal but rarely kill. A camel or a good steer may command a high enough price on the market to justify the expense of veterinary care if the animal is sick, but small ruminants do not — and the latter are the staple of the northern Somali trade. So traders have an interest in a system of disease surveillance and control that is adequate for international standards, but generally herders do not.

A further implementation problem is that the animals are grazing in and moving through more than one country, so that full disease surveillance and control requires international cooperation in a region where national rivalries are particularly intense. Even a 30-day quarantine poses a problem for some of the political entities. The Red Sea ports themselves are too far from fodder and too hot for livestock to be held dockside for a month. Somaliland has up-country trading towns which are viable way stations, but Puntland and Djibouti do not. To satisfy their trading partners fully it would be best for preliminary inspections and quarantines to begin in Ethiopia. But attempts to negotiate such arrangements have broken down so far.

What answers to these problems are feasible? At least five major solutions have been attempted, at least one of which has collapsed and none of which can yet be judged to be adequate. Given the difficulty of these problems the fact that donors and regional authorities are competing to find a solution is a good thing, as it is far from obvious which one has the best chance and some of them could usefully co-exist.

The first solution seeks to minimize the problems of disease surveillance and control by substituting the export of chilled meat for that of live animals. The certification of meat at exporting abattoirs concentrates the inspection process, eliminates the need for quarantines and diminishes the need for disease surveillance and control. The diseases that most concern the countries importing Somali livestock products at the moment can be detected at the point of slaughter. There are other dangers with chilled meat, but they are addressed at the abattoir and during transport, so they are easier for the exporter to control. Abattoirs oriented toward export are present in

Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Djibouti, Mogadishu (TFG), Burao (Somaliland), and Galkayo (Puntland) [FN: 27, 58- 59]. The best of these facilities are already accepted in the Gulf and the Burao facility is integrated with the locally-owned Dallo Airlines. Airfreight is economic for small ruminants, but the economics of beef require refrigerated sea shipment for some of the routes, which is more demanding and not yet done. There are three questions about the chilled meat option: (1) The SPS/ health inspection standards at the point of slaughter and export are quite demanding and a high quality veterinary service with integrity is necessary to provide it. Generally this is a problem for the Somali polities at present [FN: 59]. We return to veterinary inspection below. (2) Does chilled meat (vs. live animals) represent the comparative advantage of Somali producers? On the one hand, when slaughter takes place in the Horn, a larger part of the chain of value is provided locally and hides and skins are retained for alternative uses or separate export [FN: 59]. On the other, live Somali small ruminants are the ideal size for ritual family slaughter and they have a taste preferred in the region [FN: 73]. (3) Chilled meat export by air is more capital intensive, which will contribute to the concentration of the industry and may well put herders selling their animals at a greater competitive disadvantage. This last threat will not be realized as long as there is a vigorous export trade in live animals as well, where there is less concentration. It is alleged that the new export abattoirs in Addis Ababa are being financed by Saudis and well-connected members of the Ethiopian political elite, a combination that could lead to restraint of competition and could explain Ethiopia's lethargy in developing international arrangements for live animal exports at the Red Sea ports [FN: 16]. On the other hand, the very concentration of ownership interests in the chilled meat option means that it is a smaller organizational problem to mobilize businesses to solve the SPS problems that are necessary for success [FN: 86]. The chilled meat 'solution' is underway already throughout the region; time and the market will determine just how viable a way out it really is.

The second option was embodied in the EXCELEX project and the Red Sea Trading Livestock Trading Commission. The history of this largely unsuccessful endeavor is told in the companion paper on Djibouti in this series of studies [Brass, 2007]. The project sought to have the initial stages of inspection and quarantine take place in Ethiopia, with the animals moving to one of the Red Sea Somali ports for final inspection and export. Somaliland, which has its own upland grazing areas, couldn't see why the whole regulatory process couldn't be accomplished in its own country, with much shorter traveling distances out of the Ethiopian Somali ranges than the proffered alternative at Dire Dawa in Ethiopia. Ethiopia wanted to control the entire inspection and certification process, with Djibouti being nothing but a pass-through for export. (Possibly it also wished to protect its own investments in chilled meat export.) Djibouti used the patronage the USA provides in return for a military base there to build its own holding ground for the entire 30-day process. The antagonisms among the countries in the Horn over all of this grew so great that donors did not renew their support for EXCELEX and the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources shutdown the Red Sea Livestock Trading Commission, which was to oversee the whole process. [FN: 15, 38, 41, 75, 82, 90.] Technically this 'solution' made a lot of sense, but it would take special political circumstances to revive the international cooperation implicit in it.

The third solution is the opening of a hold ground for quarantines in Djibouti. In late 2006 it opened for business and did succeed in facilitating the sale of a modest number of animals into Saudi Arabia for the Haj. The absence of local fodder and its distance from most Somali grazing grounds make the economics of the project questionable. It also doesn't address issues of the control of livestock disease in the larger Somali ecosystem. But at least the Saudi trade has been reopened. As with the Ethiopian chilled-meat solution, time will tell if the market supports this option.

Fourth, the LICUS project is Somaliland and Puntland also addresses the certification and 30-day holding period issues on an intra-territorial basis. As such it too can't

respond to the issues of disease surveillance in the larger Somali ecosystem. But it has made progress at improving certification standards and planning for holding grounds. The problems encountered have been: (a) Traders have been reluctant to accept the external discipline and cost of a significantly improved disease control and veterinary certification system without firm assurance that it will reopen the lucrative Saudi market [WSP, 2005, p. 235; FN: 57]. However, Saudi plans are far from transparent and in any case the standard international practice is that a country first brings its processes up to standard and then seeks the approval of a potential trading partner. Progress has been made in creating trader organizations in Somaliland and Puntland, but in late 2006 the traders still hadn't been nudged past this negotiating impasse. [FN: 40, 83- 84.] The opening of Djibouti to livestock exports to Saudi Arabia changes the dynamics of these negotiations considerably. Now it is plausible not only that Berbera and Bosasso are missing Saudi trade but that they risk losing other trading partners in the Gulf as well if they don't undertake these reforms. The Somaliland Livestock Minister, who favors tightened standards, believes the Saudi markets are so political that the country is better-off developing other Middle Eastern markets instead, certainly a wise diversification strategy to reduce risks in any case [FN: 61-63, 84].

a. Reluctance of traders to move forward has been more pronounced in Puntland than in Somaliland [FN: 98]. Animal health personnel in Bosasso who have been profiting heavily from the current shoddy health certification process also have been strongly resistant to a change that threatens their income. The Puntland government is too weak to be able to move forward without the consent of these two groups. Somaliland, stimulated by Djibouti's competition, will probably need to take the lead in these reforms and pull the rest of the Somali authorities along in its wake.

b. The biggest problem for Somaliland is that many potential trading partners want certification from a veterinary system recognized by the OIE and the OIE deals only with internationally-recognized states, a standing Somaliland does not have as yet [FN: 82- 83]. The fifth option, SERECU, partially addresses this problem

c. A final issue in Somaliland, where it may be more visible because the process is more advanced, is the desire of the traders to have ultimate control of the certification process. As 70% of the port fees currently collected in Berbera are going into security and the livestock budget of the authority is startlingly small, they may be legitimately concerned that increased fees would be diverted to purposes other than the animal health services their trade requires. When the lower, elective house of the Somaliland legislature passed a new Veterinary Code recently it provided for much greater privatization, less government control, and a majority private oversight board – all features vigorously opposed by the Minister [FN: 50, 65, 72, 78]. (Somaliland has the only legislature in Africa which is controlled by the government opposition.) There is some legitimacy in both sides of this conflict and we will turn to it in the discussion of animal health services proper. But it does not appear that any of the Somaliland parties are going to let this legislative dispute stop forward movement on trade-related certification.

The fifth initiative was opened in 2006 by the African Union – Intergovernmental Bureau for Animal Resources (AU_IBAR) with European Union (EU) funding. SERECU (the Somali Ecosystem Rinderpest Eradication Coordination Unit) has undertaken disease surveillance exercises for all the Somali rangelands (including Ethiopia and Kenya) in order to certify the absence of rinderpest. The hope is that the TFG will certify the results for all the Somali political entities, avoiding the diplomatic problems of recognition. [Hashi, 2006; FN: 89-90, 92-94.] This approach should work well and could be extended to other diseases as long as there are no outbreaks. But it is unclear to me how the project would move from surveillance to control and eradication for anything other than rinderpest if outbreaks were detected. It also is unclear to me how the effort is to be sustained past the end of EU funding in 2010.

Common to the politics of all five of the 'solutions' that have been mooted so far is: the dominance of traders and their interests, secondary strength from members of the veterinary profession, the role of donors (often in competition with each other), and the prominence of national jealousies. Absent has been any influence from the pastoralists themselves, save as it has been expressed through the donors [e.g., DFID, 2006]. The issues are so important that it is imperative that the Somali authorities continue to work on them, although the precise modality that will bring a final solution will emerge only out of intensely political processes.

We turn now to the structure of the animal health services themselves, which have to underlie any improvement in the health and safety of Somali livestock products. Veterinary services never have been strong in North-Eastern Kenya, the Somali National Region of Ethiopia, or Djibouti. The services in the territories of the three other Somali polities have been decimated by the financial ravages of 15 years of civil war. Even in Somaliland, government animal health services are absent outside the cities, many former veterinary personnel are unemployed, and the trained staff who remain are concentrated on certification services at the port. The only people providing animal health for the pastoralists are the minimally-trained cadres of private Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), whom various donors (NGO and otherwise) have created [FN: 37]. CAHWs generally are paid by herders for curative treatment only of large ruminants, are hired privately for vaccinations only in the face of an epizootic outbreak, and are never employed by herders for surveillance or quarantine. CAHWs are expected to finance themselves out of the sale of clinical services, although those that continue to practice are doing so only by supplementing their income with livestock herding [FN: 98]. Many of the cadres of CAHWs are unsupervised and receive no refresher courses for their work, both of which greatly concern the Livestock Minister for Somaliland [FN; 66, 98]. CAHWs have provided pastoralists with important services in a period in which the state could not and it is widely accepted that the state will not return to the practice of curative medicine, which will remain private.

On the other hand, the CAHW 'system', if constituted to stand alone, as has so far in the Somali entities, is wholly inadequate for providing disease surveillance and control. The literature on the reform of veterinary systems in Africa is quite clear that the state has to be involved in some way if collective goods such as disease prevention are to be provided adequately [Leonard, 2000a]. Furthermore the international structures regulating international trade in livestock and their products require certification from a state-based veterinary service that is able to demonstrate its ability to supervise local disease detection. Thus, if the Somalis are to have a secure place in international livestock trade, their government veterinary services have to be resurrected and be able to supervise local animal health services. Few want to see the re-creation of the old statist veterinary systems, but there are models of public-private cooperation that could be pursued. The quality of current and projected livestock export certification would be substantially enhanced if the veterinary services of the political system had the ability to detect and control disease outbreaks. This could be achieved, for example, by paying CAHWs a small retainer to report on diseases in their areas and hiring them for vaccination campaigns when there is an outbreak. The state/authority would need only a certificate or diploma-level animal health worker in each district to receive these reports and supervise any campaigns, under the direction of a few veterinarians working from the capital, in order to dramatically improve disease surveillance and control. Without such a system it is hard to see how the new cadre of animal health workers being trained at Sheikh in Somaliland are going to find gainful employment. This type of system would have very modest costs, but herders would not consent to the taxes or fees necessary to pay for them at present. The question is whether traders will now consent to an export fee for these purposes in order to secure their access to international markets. The state/authority and the traders have to see these services as an investment against other economically-devastating bans on livestock trade in the future and hope

to regain the costs through an increased volume and price of trade. As the creation of such a service is a pump-priming exercise, it may well be attractive to some donors.

Of course a fully adequate veterinary surveillance and control system would need to extend into the Somali National Region (V) of Ethiopia, where the animals spend much of the year and which also lacks an adequate veterinary system. In an ideal world the Somali Region of Ethiopia would adopt a similar system to the one proposed above for the other Somali political entities and there would be coordination between the two. At the moment this seems unlikely. But cooperation between technicians has always been better in the Horn than it has been at the level of high politics. Furthermore, Ethiopia may have an interest in consolidating its relationships with the Red Sea Somali ports. It has lost access already to the Eritrean ports and doesn't want to rely exclusively on Djibouti. The logic of the situation for the north and northeastern Somali ports implies a greater openness to multiple types of cooperation, particularly on livestock, than has always been evident in the past. [FN: 96]

At the moment, however, the actual trading partners of the Somalis in the Gulf seem willing to accept a health certification process that is based on regulatory control of the animals for 21 to 30 days. This is feasible within the boundaries of a single Somali political system and the framework of the LICUS and SERECU projects (although it will strain Djibouti the most). The immediate priorities for policy reform are to continue to push this process forward, while also constructing a government veterinary service that can utilize and supervise private CAHWs.

Pharmaceutical Supplies

Pharmaceutical supplies have emerged as an important problem in the Somali systems. Throughout the region medicines, vaccines and acaricides are being distributed from a bewilderingly wide variety of manufacturers, have inconsistent dosages, are often past their expiry date, have suffered a break in the necessary cold-chain, or are sometimes counterfeit [FN: 44]. In most of the political systems in which the Somali herd their cattle there is no effective regulation of this pharmaceutical trade, with the realities ranging from the existence of a code that is ignored in Northeast Kenya to none at all in Puntland. [WSP, 2001, pp. 172-73, 186; WSP, 2005, pp. 247-48.] In most countries in Africa formal trade in veterinary pharmaceuticals is subject to import controls by the state and is handled by licensed pharmacies or those working under the supervision of certified animal health personnel. There are questions about whether this model is too restrictive, making it very difficult (as in northern Kenya) for pastoralists to obtain legally the drugs they need. And an unmet demand gives special impetus to informal trade, outside of legal channels. Hence many argue that Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), who at least have some training in veterinary medicine, should be permitted to sell some veterinary pharmaceuticals in pastoralist areas, particularly if they have links to veterinary professionals. [Leonard, 2000b, pp. 19-22; Ly, 2000.] In central Africa even this level of control probably has been irreparably undermined by the manufacture of counterfeit drugs in Nigeria. In the Greater Horn of Africa, on the other hand, counterfeit and sub-optimal pharmaceuticals are being imported from outside the region through ports that could be controlled. Still the pharmaceutical problem would have to be addressed on a regional basis; smuggling across borders within the region is simply too easy. If an international organization such as the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) or the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which include most of the countries in the region with pastoralist systems, were to negotiate a common regulatory regime for these products, it would be politically feasible for the Somali systems to cooperate and enforce these standards (even if a few traders continued to engage in smuggling). But any attempt to address these problems in a regulatory manner within the

boundaries of a single Somali political system probably would have minimal real effect and would be undermined by cross-border smuggling by traders and herders [FN: 94].

On the other hand, it may be possible to make some progress on these issues through a purely educational approach [FN: 44]. After all, pastoralists have an interest in purchasing only efficacious veterinary products; their problem is recognizing what products will work. Quality can emerge in a market with imperfect information if the parties engaged in the transactions do enough business together long enough for them to recognize quality in the results achieved and to value repeat business. If pastoralists can be educated to buy regularly from the same pharmaceutical providers (so they know over time who is providing good products) and if those same providers, including CAHWs, are brought to see that the constancy of that custom will enhance their long-term income, then the market can provide an improved result.

PART VI: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

How can the Somalis, despite the on-going conflicts in the Horn of Africa, make full use of their competitive advantage as skilled livestock producers in an ecosystem that is close to lucrative markets and has several good ports for reaching them?

Land and water issues are critical to the livestock production system but the Somali polities have too little ability to project their authority into the rural areas to address them effectively at the moment. It would be valuable for Somali policy-makers to participate in IGAD-LPI sponsored technical discussions of these issues, however, both to educate themselves for the future and for them to represent Somali perspectives to the other countries in the region. The TFG is the only one of the three political entities in the former Somalia that is internationally recognized. Thus formal discussions at the diplomatic level are precluded. All the political systems in the area have shown considerable flexibility on technical discussions and cooperation, however [FN: 93]. The effectiveness of the environmentally-motivated ban on the export of charcoal from the ports of Berbera and Bosasso does show that even these weak systems have the ability to act when there is broad consensus on a problem and the decision can be enforced in the ports, where the authorities are strongest.

Ethiopian barriers to cross-border livestock trade reduce herder incomes, even if ultimately they are ineffective. A change in the tenor of international relations in the Horn of Africa and a realization that trade policies do not have to be zero-sum games would be necessary before progress could be made on this problem. There are scenarios to the grand political game in the Horn that might make this possible in the future, so continued education and discussion of this matter through IGAD-LPI sponsored forums is worthwhile.

All parties are agreed that the most important policy issue facing Somali livestock producers and traders are the animal health and certification issues that restrict exports into the Middle East. A disease certification process for live animal exports that is internationally convincing requires investment in an expanded and significantly restructured set of animal health systems. Traders are willing to pay for at least some of this, but have wanted advance assurances of profit and fear government misappropriation of the funds to other purposes, most especially to the youth in the militias/ armies. Some progress has been made by organizing the traders into national associations and more is possible through negotiations. Traders in Somaliland and Puntland will now be more motivated by competition from Djibouti. Nonetheless, a fully satisfactory solution to this problem area is likely to require some 'pump-priming' by donors. There are several competing initiatives underway to solve the animal health certification and export trade problems and it is unclear which one(s) will succeed in the long run. Most of these initiatives and their associated processes are highly political and the various livestock authorities must be the primary actors in the needed international discussions. Nonetheless, IGAD-LPI can create a foundation for such negotiations by creating region-wide forums in which analysis of the technical issues can be presented, discussed, and negotiated.

Related to the animal health issues are those of veterinary pharmaceuticals. There are serious problems with poor quality products being sold throughout the region and good quality ones being unavailable in too many areas. The best solution to poor quality pharmaceuticals would be a regulatory one, but this would require cooperative action throughout the IGAD region. Short of regulation, it may be possible to educate both pharmaceutical vendors who are permanent in a locality and the herder who patronize them that long-term trading partners can come to recognize and reward quality, consistency and reliability. IGAD-LPI could play a part both in facilitating the

educational thrust and promoting regional negotiations on regulation, as this would not be controversial between member states.

Overall, donors, Somali authorities, and trader associations are already working on the policy issues on which progress is possible at present. The role that IGAD-LPI can most usefully play is to create regional forums in which these issues can be addressed across borders by technical staff, traders and herders. In the long run this can create the shared knowledge and perspectives that will be foundational to hoped-for international negotiations in the future. IGAD-LPI provides one of the few venues where Somali livestock production issues can be addressed across the boundaries of the six political entities that divide its ecosystem.

APPENDIX A: MAP OF SOMALIA AND ITS REGIONS

Source:
United Nations www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/somalia.pdf

Map No. 3690 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
January 2007

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

APPENDIX B: MAP OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF SOMALI CLANS

Source: Lewis, 1998 (1961), p. 9.



BIBLIOGRAPHY & REFERENCES

Awale Al. et al. 2006. Impact of Civil War on Natural Resources: A Case Study for Somaliland (Northwest Somalia). Hargeisa: Candlelight for Health, Education & Environment.

Bates R.H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bates R.H. 1983. Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berry S. 1993. No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Besteman C. Cassanelli LV, eds. 1996. The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia. London: Westview Press.

Brass J.N. 2007. "The Political Economy of Livestock Policy: The Case of Djibouti" (Addis Ababa and Djibouti: Intergovernmental Authority on Development Livestock Policy Initiative).

Bryden, M. Farah, A.Y., 1996. The Peace Committees for Somaliland: Case Study of a Grassroots Peace-Making Initiative. UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia.

Dawkins R. 1976. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Devereux S. 2006. Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia. IDS Research Report 57. Brighton (U.K.): Institute of Development Studies.

DFID. 2006. Peace, Trade and Unity: Reporting from the Horn of Africa Regional Pastoralist Gathering, Qarsaa dembii, Yabello, Ethiopia. United Kingdom: Department for International Development.

Evans-Pritchard E.E. 1940. The Nuer. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Fearon JD, Laitin D.D. 2000. "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity." International Organization 54, no.4: 845-877.

Food Security Analysis Unit Somalia. 2006. "Post GU '06 Assessment & Analysis". SACB FSRD Meeting. Nairobi.

Grosse-Kettler S. 2004. External Actors in Stateless Somalia: A War Economy and Its Promoters, Paper 39, (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion).

Halderman M. 2005. The Political Economy of pro-Poor Livestock Policy Making in Ethiopia. Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative Working Paper 19. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.

Hashi A.M. 2006. "AU-IBAR Assistance to Establish Minimum Veterinary Service Structure in Somalia", unpublished Concept Note (September 6) (AU-IBAR/ PACE-SERECU).

Hobbes T. 1651. Levithian, or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Waealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil.

International Crisis Group [ICG]. 2002. Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace. Nairobi: 9 December.

International Crisis Group [ICG]. 2005. Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds? Africa Report 95. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Lakoff G. 2002. Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. 2nd edition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Leonard D.K. (ed.) 2000a. Africa's Changing Markets for Health and Veterinary Services: The New Institutional Issues. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Leonard D.K. 2000b. "The New Institutional Economics and the Restructuring of Animal Health Services in Africa" in Africa's Changing Markets for Health and Veterinary Systems: The New Institutional Issues, (ed.) by D. K. Leonard. London: Macmillan, Chap. 1.

Leonard D.K. 2006. The Political Economy of International Development and Pro-Poor Livestock Policies: A Comparative Assessment: Revised and Expanded. Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative Working Paper 35. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.

Lewis I.M. 1999. A Pastoral Democracy. Oxford, Muenster-Hamburg: James Curry Publishers, International African Institute.

Lewis I.M. 2002. A Modern History of the Somali Nation and State in the Horn of Africa. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Little, P. 2005. Unofficial Trade When States Are Weak: The Case of Cross Border Commerce in the Horn of Africa. Research Paper 2005/ 13. Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Little, P. Teka, T., Azeze, A. 2001. Cross-Border Livestock Trade and Food Security in the Horn of Africa: An Overview. Addis Ababa: USAID BASIS-CRSP.

Ly C. 2000. Management and Impact of Auxiliaries on Pastoral Production and Veterinary Services Delivery in Senegal. In Africa's Changing Markets for Health and Veterinary Systems: The New Institutional Issues, (ed.) DK Leonard. London: Macmillan.

Magagna V. 1991. Communities of Grain: Rural Rebellion in Comparative Perspective. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Manor, J. (ed.) 2007. Aid That Works: Successful Development Strategies in Fragile States (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank).

Marie A. (ed.) 1997. L'Afrique des individus. Paris: Editions Karthala.

Medani K. 2003. Globalization, Informal Markets and Collective Action: The Development of Islamic and Ethnic Politics in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia. PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.

Migdal J. 1974. Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures toward Political and Social Change in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Nenova T. and Harford T. 2004. "Anarchy and Invention", Public Policy for the Private Sector, Note No. 280 (November) (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank).

North D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – Somalia. 2007, "Situation Report 38" (04 May) (Nairobi: OCHA – Somalia).

O'Hagen T. 1999. Rousseau. London: Routledge.

Omar A.A., and Sugulle A.J. 2004. Case Study on Impact of Charcoal on Socio Economy and Environment (Hargeisa: Ministry of Pastoral Development and Environment, Somaliland).

Pérouse de Montclos. M.A. 2001. Interprétations d'un conflit : le cas de la Somalie (Pessac, France: Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire, Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux).

Rousseau J-J. 1992 [1755]. Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inegalite parmi des hommes. Paris: Livres de Poche.

Rousseau J-J. 2001 [1762]. Du contract social, presentation par Bruno Bernardi. Paris: Flammarion.

Samatar AI. 1989. The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884 – 1986. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development. 1999. A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins. Hargeysa: War-torn Societies Project.

Tilly C. 1992. Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990- 1992. Revised (ed.) Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Tuck R. 1989. Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

War-torn Societies Project Somali Programme[WSP]. 2001. Rebuilding Somalia: Issues and Possibilities for Puntland. London: HAAN Associates and WSP International.

War-torn Societies Project Somali Programme[WSP]. 2004. "Dialogue for Peace: 'Wada-tashiga Nabadda', National Project Group Meeting. Geneva and Nairobi: WSP International.

War-torn Societies Project International Somali Programme [WSP], 2005. Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities. Lawrenceville, N.J. and Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press and WSP International.

Weber M. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe).

Wokler R. 2001. Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.